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OPPY ON THE ARGUMENT FROM CONSCIOUSNESS
J. P. Moreland
Graham Oppy has launched the most effective criticism to date of an argument  
for God’s existence from the existence of irreducible mental states or their 
regular correlation with physical states (AC). I seek to undercut Oppy’s 
central defeaters of AC. In particular, I argue, first, that Oppy has not  
provided successful defeaters against the use of a distinctive form of ex-
planation—personal explanation—employed in premise (3) of AC; second, I  
expose a confusion on Oppy’s part with respect to AC’s premise (5), and 
show that this confusion results in a failure to grasp adequately the dialecti-
cal force of (5). As a result, Oppy fails to offer adequate rejoinders to (5), or 
so I shall argue.
I sometimes hear laypeople express, quite commonsensically, an argument 
to the effect that since we have minds and mind can’t come from matter, 
there must be a Grand Mind that best explains the existence of our minds. 
In the last thirty years or so, a small handful of philosophers have advanced 
this sort of argument in a more rigorous, careful way.1 And while the ar-
gument has been endorsed by some well-known natural theologians,2 it 
has not garnered much attention from critics or those sympathetic to it. A 
notable exception to this rule is Graham Oppy, who has launched the most 
effective criticism of the argument to date in conjunction with Swinburne’s 
formulation of it.3 Oppy tends to pepper an argument in his cross hairs with 
numerous, bullet-like criticisms, and his treatment of the argument from 
consciousness (hereafter, AC) is no exception to this rule. Fortunately for 
1See Robert Adams, “Flavors, Colors, and God,” reprinted in Contemporary Perspectives 
on Religious Epistemology, ed. R. Douglas Geivett and Brendan Sweetman (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1992), 225–240; Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1979), chapter 9; The Evolution of the Soul (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 183–196; Is There a 
God? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 69–94; “The Origin of Consciousness,” in Cosmic 
Beginnings and Human Ends, ed. Clifford N. Matthews and Roy Abraham Varghese (Chicago and 
La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1995), 355–378; J. P. Moreland, Consciousness and the Existence of God 
(New York: Routledge, 2008); “The Argument from Consciousness,” in A Companion to Natural 
Theology, ed. William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland (Oxford and Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2009), 
282–343; The Recalcitrant Imago Dei: Human Persons and the Failure of Naturalism (London: S. 
C. M. Press, 2009), chapter 2.
2See William Lane Craig, “Natural Theology: Introduction,” in Philosophy of Religion, ed. 
William Lane Craig (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2002), 76–77; Charles Taliaferro, 
Evidence and Faith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 407–409, 437.
3Graham Oppy, Arguing about Gods (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
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my purposes, some of his criticisms target idiosyncrasies in Swinburne’s 
particular formulation of AC,4 others I have addressed elsewhere,5 and oth-
ers are generic difficulties with arguments for God and not problems with 
AC in particular.6 Thus, I shall limit my response to Oppy accordingly. 
In particular, I shall, first, argue that Oppy has not provided successful 
defeaters against the use of a distinctive form of explanation—personal ex-
planation—employed in premise (3) of AC (see below); second, expose a 
confusion on Oppy’s part with respect to AC’s premise (5) (see below); and 
third, show that this confusion results in a failure to grasp adequately the 
dialectical force of (5). As a result, Oppy fails to offer adequate rejoinders 
to (5), or so I shall argue.
The General Structure of AC
AC may be expressed in inductive or deductive form. As an inductive ar-
gument, AC may be construed as claiming that given theism and natural-
ism as the live options fixed by our background beliefs, theism provides 
a better explanation of consciousness than naturalism and, thus, receives 
some confirmation from the existence of consciousness.7 The inductive 
form of AC may be expressed along Bayesian lines or construed as an 
inference to the best explanation.
AC may also be expressed in deductive form, and its advocates will 
(or should) argue that it is sound and contains premises that are more 
plausible than their contradictories.8 Here is one deductive version of AC:
(1)  Genuinely non-physical mental states exist.
(2)  If genuinely non-physical mental states exist, then there is an expla-
nation for the existence of mental states.
(3)  If there is an explanation for the existence of mental states, then the 
explanation for the existence of mental states is either a personal 
explanation or a natural scientific explanation.
(4)  The explanation for the existence of mental states is either a per-
sonal or a natural scientific explanation.
4I have in mind things such as Swinburne’s distinctions among partial, full, complete, 
ultimate and absolute explanations, and Swinburne’s employment of theoretical simplicity.
5For example, I have defended property/event dualism as it figures into premise (1) of 
AC in “The Knowledge Argument Revisited,” International Philosophical Quarterly 43 (June 
2003), 219–228. 
6For example, Oppy argues against premise (7) below on the grounds that alternatives 
to orthodox theism—polytheism, a committee of gods, etc.—are plausible. See Oppy, Argu-
ing about Gods, 401.
7I explain why panpsychism should not be considered a live option alongside natural-
ism and theism in Consciousness and the Existence of God, chapter 6.
8Oppy would not accept this characterization of a successful argument. For an analysis 
and response to Oppy on this point, see William Lane Craig, “Arguing Successfully about 
God: A Review Essay of Graham Oppy’s Arguing about Gods,” Philosophia Christi 10:2 (2008), 
435–442.
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(5)  The explanation for the existence of mental states is not a natural 
scientific one.
(6)  Therefore, the explanation is a personal one.
(7)  If the explanation for the existence of mental states is personal, then 
it is theistic.
(8)  Therefore, the explanation for the existence of mental states is theistic.
Before I address Oppy’s arguments, I should say a word about (4). 
(4) turns on the fact that personal explanation differs from event-causal 
covering law explanations employed in natural science. Associated with 
event causation is a covering law model of explanation according to which 
some event (the explanandum) is explained by giving a correct deductive 
or inductive argument for that event. Such an argument contains two fea-
tures in its explanans: a (universal or statistical) law of nature and initial 
causal conditions. Sometimes a covering law explanation is underwritten 
by some sort of realist model of the entities involved in the causal pro-
cesses in view.
By contrast, a personal explanation (divine or otherwise) of some state of 
affairs brought about intentionally by a person will employ notions such 
as the intention of the agent and the relevant power of the agent that was 
exercised in causing the state of affairs. In general, a personal explanation 
of some basic result R brought about intentionally by person P where this 
bringing about of R is a basic action A will cite the intention I of P that R 
occur and the basic power B that P exercised to bring about R. P, I, and B 
provide a personal explanation of R: agent P brought about R by exercising 
power B in order to realize intention I as an irreducibly teleological goal.
Personal Explanation and Premise (3)
Oppy’s first argument against personal explanation as a unique explana-
tory form is that if eliminative materialism is true, personal explanations 
are not real explanations: “[T]he ‘eliminative’ view [implies] that, in a 
properly basic sense, personal explanations are not genuinely explana-
tions at all. . . . [I]f personal explanation is merely apparent—that is, not 
genuine—explanation, then, on Swinburne’s own account, theism will 
not be a genuinely explanatory theory.”9
Now eliminative materialism is a highly contentious theory that has 
not garnered much acceptance, even among physicalist philosophers 
of mind. Moreover, I have argued elsewhere that our knowledge of the 
existence and nature of mental states is in accordance with their self-
presenting nature and due to direct awareness.10 Thus, that knowledge 
is not primarily based on mental states serving as explanatorily useful 
9Oppy, Arguing about Gods, 386.
10Moreland, “The Knowledge Argument Revisited,” 219–228.
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posits in, say, folk psychology, that could be undercut by eliminating 
mental states in favor of the postulates of a more acceptable theory.
However, waiving these points, we can still ask whether Oppy’s argu-
ment is a successful defeater of personal explanation as employed in (3). 
I don’t think it is. The main justification for premise (3) is the difference 
between libertarian agency and lawlike event causality. Now, even if we 
grant for the sake of argument that eliminative materialism is true for 
finite, conscious beings, a defense of (3) requires only a concept of libertar-
ian agency and personal explanation, even if we grant a physical, event-
causal theory of action for, say, human acts. Indeed, most theists take God 
to be a libertarian agent who exemplifies the mental properties relevant 
to agency, so whether or not humans are such agents or have such mental 
states is irrelevant. If we have such a clear conception of personal explana-
tion, then even if human acts do not fall under it, under the right circum-
stances, it could be argued that a form of explanation clearly available to 
us is now to be employed. What those circumstances are and whether they 
obtain are more centrally related to premises (2) and (5) of AC and not (3), 
so I need not go into them in detail here. For example, someone may be 
squeamish about a vicious infinite regress here and believe that the notion 
of first-moving active power entailed by Swinburnean personal explana-
tion is the only fitting stopping place for such a regress. Or one may think 
that personal explanation is an essential component of a successful kalam 
cosmological argument, and go on to employ it here regarding conscious-
ness. What those circumstances are need not concern us further because 
enough has been said to refute Oppy’s argument against (3).
It could be responded that if we grant eliminative materialism for the 
sake of argument, then there just are no conscious properties/events that 
need to be explained. But, again, this would be a problem with the ex-
planandum in (1), not with the personal explanans in (3). Obviously, if 
mental events do not exist, AC is a non-starter and it’s advocate will need 
to defend property/event dualism. Our task here is to defend personal 
explanation as employed in (3).
Oppy’s second argument is raised against Swinburne’s attempt to de-
fend the irreducibility of personal to scientific event-event causation by 
presenting a case of causal deviancy in which a person in an audience 
intends to get the speaker’s attention, and this intent causes him to fidget 
which, in turn, does get the speaker’s attention.11 By contrast, Oppy argues 
that such reducibility is quite plausible. In this context, note that what 
Oppy claims is reducible is not mental states to physical states, though he 
may, indeed, believe such is possible. Rather, Oppy has in view the reduc-
tion of personal explanation and intentional action to event-causal expla-
nation and a causal theory of action. Swinburne’s point is that in such 
cases, an event causal theory of action is satisfied, but the act is not an 
intentional one; thus, intentional action cannot be reduced to event-event 
11Oppy, Arguing about Gods, 387. 
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causation nor can personal explanation be reduced to scientific explana-
tion. Oppy’s response is that Swinburne is correct to see the fidgeter as 
failing to exhibit intentional action, but Swinburne cites the wrong reason 
for the failure. Oppy’s argument here is abridged and opaque, but I think 
he has something like this in mind. A causal theory of action will say that 
the fidgeter’s act was not an intentional one because it will employ a total 
and not partial explanation of the mental cause of action, and in this case, 
there are mental causes of his fidgeting besides the desire to be noticed 
that are irrelevant to the intentional action to be noticed (e.g., the fidg-
eter’s lack of self-worth) and there is an absence of mental states relevant 
to making the act an intentional one (e.g., the belief that by fidgeting, the 
person will be noticed by the speaker). Thus, Swinburne’s example does 
not undercut the idea that personal explanation can be reduced to scien-
tific explanation.
I have two responses to Oppy’s counterargument. First, he is confused 
about the nature of type reduction and, as a result, draws the wrong con-
clusion from his argument. In type reduction (e.g., painfulness is C-fiber 
firing) there are two non-synonymous, co-referring terms/concepts. In 
such reductions, the intentional object of the reductively targeted term 
or concept is identified with the intentional object of the favored term. 
In such cases, the intentional “objects” are reduced, but not the referring 
terms/concepts. Regarding the latter, there is actually a replacement. For 
example, after reduction it is believed that there is nothing that accurately 
corresponds to the dualist pre-reductive concept of pain, and the nature 
of pain turns out to be accurately captured by “being a C-fiber firing.” 
Thus, reduction occurs with respect to the intentional object, and a type 
of replacement occurs with respect to the co-referring concepts.
This point is grasped by sophisticated attempts to reduce libertarian 
agency to an event-causal sequence. For example, John Bishop argues that 
there are no such things as libertarian types of acts and, accordingly, re-
duces all such types of acts along event-causal lines.12 But when it comes 
to the concept of libertarian action, he does not reduce it to the concept of 
event-causal action. Instead, he offers a concept of the latter that is close to 
the former, and recommends that we eliminate the concept of libertarian 
action in favor of his alternative.
Now, explanations are conceptual entities. Thus, even if human inten-
tional actions are identified with relevant event-causal chains, it does not 
follow that the concept of personal explanation has been analyzed into 
the concept of an event-causal scientific explanation. We simply have two 
different concepts that co-refer in the case of human action, along with 
the replacement of the former, less preferable concept with the latter, more 
accurate concept. But, then, we are back to eliminativism regarding the 
concept of personal explanation, and my criticisms above would be rel-
evant for defeating this move.
12John Bishop, Natural Agency (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
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Second, it is far from clear that Oppy’s reason for the failure of the fidg-
eter’s act to be an intentional one is preferable to Swinburne’s. In general, 
it seems that a causal chain from event e1 to e2 could always be deviant. 
Thus, even if we take into account the “complete” set of prior mental states 
including all and only those relevant to the fidgeter’s act, these could still 
produce the act in the wrong way and, thus, fail to satisfy the necessary 
conditions for being an intentional act. For a libertarian like Swinburne, 
the issue here is not the “completeness” or lack thereof of the relevant 
prior mental state, but the way it figures into the act. For Swinburne, an 
intentional act is caused by the agent, not his prior mental states which 
are, instead, the reason for acting.
Suppose one were to respond that in certain basic actions between a 
basic intent and a basic result, there just is no intermediate event and, so, 
no possibility of causal deviancy. In this case, a reduction of intentional to 
event-causal action is possible. Perhaps, it could be argued, success here 
could fund the hope that with more work, a similar reduction will be 
forthcoming with respect to non-basic actions constituted by action plans.
Granting for the sake of argument that there are such basic actions with 
no intermediate events, I still do not think the reduction works because it 
is still possible to employ simultaneous causation to generate a relevant 
deviant causal factor. Modifying a recent discussion of simultaneous cau-
sation by E. J. Lowe,13 consider the following diagram:
T0
T1
E1 E2
E3
In this case E1 at time T0 partially and directly causes E3 at T1 and par-
tially and indirectly causes E3 though simultaneously causing E2 at T0. 
Here, the occurrence of E3 is counterfactually dependent on each causal 
route. Let E1 and E2 be the mental states relevant to the basic action result 
E3 and let the chain from E1 to E3 via E2 be deviant. The occurrence of E3 
seems to be unintentional because it is partially brought about by a devi-
ant chain and not solely by the direct action of the relevant mental state. 
Such a scenario seems coherent and possible, and unless it can be shown 
to be otherwise, it seems to provide a counterexample to the reduction of 
basic actions to (scientific) event-causal sequences.
13See E. J. Lowe, Personal Agency (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 48–51. Lowe’s 
discussion involved three causal chains, not just two, because he is interested in addressing 
a version of physical causal closure. He also has it that the relevant simultaneous cause is 
a mental one, but I see no reason to limit simultaneous causation in this way. If the reader 
disagrees, then just use an evil demon for the simultaneous cause.
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I conclude that Oppy has not provided sufficient defeaters to warrant 
the rejection of personal explanation as employed in premise (3).14
Confusion about the Concept of “Natural” in Premise (5)
There are two different meanings to “natural” relevant to (5). Oppy seems 
to employ the wrong sense. Not only is it wrong, but of the two, it is rela-
tively anemic. As a result, Oppy fails to appreciate the strength of AC’s 
employment of the existence of mental states as a defeater for naturalism 
and confirmation of theism. Thus, his own counterarguments to (5) do not 
have the dialectical force Oppy takes them to have.
What are the two different meanings to “natural”? The first one is rela-
tively easy to characterize: “natural” means “regular or normal (usual).” 
In this sense, to say that mental states are natural is to say simply that they 
are regularly correlated with physical states or that they occur normally, 
perhaps in lawlike ways. According to the second definition, “natural” 
means “not surprising or puzzling, at home and not odd.” In this sense, to 
say that mental states are natural is to say their appearance is not surpris-
ing or odd, but rather quite at home, given the rest of a naturalist creation 
story (the Grand Story) and ontology.15
Relatively speaking, the former sense is anemic and it is the one em-
ployed by Oppy. However, advocates of AC utilize the more robust, latter 
sense.16 Before I demonstrate my claim about Oppy, however, the sec-
ond sense needs a bit more clarification, and given present concerns, let 
us limit our discussion to naturalism as a rival to theism. Note that the 
second sense has an epistemic/explanatory component and an ontologi-
cal component, viz., “surprising, not puzzling” and “at home, not odd,” 
respectively.
Regarding the naturalist Grand Story, scientific theories that are par-
adigm cases of epistemic/explanatory success (e.g., the atomic theory of 
matter, evolutionary biology) employ combinatorial modes of explana-
tion. Thus any process that constitutes the Grand Story and any entity in 
the naturalist ontology should exhibit an ontological structure analyzable 
in terms that are isomorphic with such modes of explanation. Perhaps 
more than anyone, Colin McGinn has defended this idea along with what 
14Oppy does, however, raise an effective objection to a passage on page 46 of Swin-
burne’s 1979 edition of The Existence of God (New York: Oxford University Press 1979; rev. 
2004). Swinburne argues that two full explanations of some explanandum E imply over-
determination because each is necessary and sufficient to explain E. Oppy correctly shows 
that in fact, and even on Swinburne’s own account, overdetermination requires only that 
the two competing causal factors are each sufficient, not necessary and sufficient. Interest-
ingly, in the 2004, second (revised) edition of The Existence of God, the offending passage has 
been removed (see p. 46).
15The Grand Story amounts to an etiological account of how all entities whatsoever have 
come to be, told in terms of an event causal story and combinatorial processes described in 
natural scientific terms with a central role given to the atomic theory of matter and evolu-
tionary biology. The Grand Story eschews agent causation and irreducible teleology.
16This is the sense I use in my defenses of AC. For Swinburne, see The Existence of God, 
1979 edition, 52, 170–174; in the revised 2004 edition, see 204–209.
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he takes it to entail, viz., the inability of naturalism to explain genuinely 
unique, simple emergent properties:
Can we gain any deeper insight into what makes the problem of conscious-
ness run against the grain of our thinking? Are our modes of theorizing 
about the world of the wrong shape to extend to the nature of mind? I think 
we can discern a characteristic structure possessed by successful scientific 
theories, a structure that is unsuitable for explaining consciousness. . . . Is 
there a “grammar” to science that fits the physical world but becomes shaky 
when applied to the mental world? Perhaps the most basic aspect of thought 
is the operation of combination. This is the way in which we think of complex 
entities as resulting from the arrangement of simpler parts. There are three 
aspects to this basic idea: the atoms we start with, the laws we use to com-
bine them, and the resulting complexes . . . I think it is clear that this mode 
of understanding is central to what we think of as scientific theory; our sci-
entific faculty involves representing the world in this combinatorial style.17
Thus, given the Grand Story, the explanatory aspect of “natural” im-
plies that structural properties (being water, methane) are not surprising 
or puzzling, whereas genuinely emergent ones (secondary qualities, men-
tal properties) are.
The second component of “natural” is straightforwardly ontological: 
“at home, not odd.” In this sense, the naturalness of a postulated entity 
is a function of its relationship to the ontology of the overall theory of 
which it is a part. The types of entities postulated, along with the sorts of 
properties they possess and the relations into which they enter, should 
be at home with other entities in the theory, and, in this sense, be natural 
for the theory. Some entity (particular thing, process, property, or rela-
tion) e is natural for a theory T just in case either e is a central, core entity 
of T or e bears a relevant similarity to central, core entities in e’s category 
within T. If e is in a category such as substance, force, property, event, 
relation, or cause, e should bear a relevant similarity to other entities of T 
in that category. This is a formal definition and the material content given 
to it will depend on the theory in question. The basic entities constitutive 
of the Grand Story provide the material content for naturalism, viz., the 
particulars, properties, relations and laws that characterize the entities of 
microphysics, their combinatorial processes, and the structural entities 
that result. From the time of Boyle to the present, these entities have been 
construed as bereft of secondary qualities or mental properties.
It is worth pointing out that, given rivals R and S, the postulation of e in 
R is ad hoc and question-begging against advocates of S if e bears a relevant 
similarity to the appropriate entities in S, and in this sense is “at home” in 
S, but fails to bear this relevant similarity to the appropriate entities in R.18 
17Collin McGinn, The Mysterious Flame (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 55–56. Cf. 54–62, 
90, 95.
18For example, suppose theory S explains phenomena in terms of discrete corpuscles 
and actions by contact, while R uses continuous waves to explain phenomena. If some 
phenomenon x were best explained in corpuscularian categories, it would be ad hoc and 
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The notion of “being ad hoc” is notoriously difficult to specify precisely. It 
is usually characterized as an intellectually inappropriate adjustment of a 
theory whose sole epistemic justification is to save the theory from falsifi-
cation. Such an adjustment involves adding a new supposition to a theory 
not already implied by its other features. In the context of evaluating rivals 
R and S, the principle just mentioned provides a sufficient condition for 
the postulation of e to be ad hoc and question-begging.
The issue of naturalness is relevant to theory assessment between rivals 
in that it provides a criterion for advocates of a theory to claim that their 
rivals have begged the question against them or adjusted their theory in an 
inappropriate, ad hoc way. And though this need not be the case, natural-
ness can be related to the claim that some entity is basic and need only be 
correlated with other entities: Naturalness can provide a means of decid-
ing the relative merits of accepting theory R, which depicts phenomenon 
e as basic, vs. embracing S, which takes e to be explainable in more basic 
terms. If e is natural in S but not in R, it will be difficult for advocates of R 
to justify the bald assertion that e is basic in R and that all proponents of 
R need to do is describe e and correlate it with other phenomena in R as 
opposed to explaining e. Such a claim by advocates of R will be even more 
problematic if S provides an explanation for e.19
As noted above, Oppy employs “regular or normal” for “natural.” I say 
this for three reasons: First, in rebutting Swinburne’s argument that natural 
scientific laws cannot explain the regular connections between enormously 
qualitatively different kinds of events, Oppy claims that we regularly find 
adequate scientific accounts of such different kinds of events in the macro 
and micro worlds that are quite natural, indeed. And he offers, as an ex-
ample, explanations of the macro-phenomenon of heat conductivity in an 
iron bar in terms of the motion and kinetic energy of the bar’s microscopic 
parts.20 Oppy’s analogy is a bad one if “natural” means “not surprising or 
puzzling, at home and not odd,” because, given the reductive analysis of 
heat conductivity to the micro-phenomenon of molecular vibration (in sol-
ids) and translational motion and collisions (in liquids and gases), irreduc-
ible mental states are clearly surprising and odd with respect to brain states 
in a way that heat conductivity is not with respect to molecular vibration. 
question-begging for advocates of R simply to adjust their entities to take on particle prop-
erties in the case of x. Such properties would not bear a relevant similarity to other entities 
in R and would be more natural and at home in S.
19For example, suppose that R is Neo-Darwinism and S is a version of punctuated equilib-
rium theory. Simply for the sake of illustration, suppose further that R depicts evolutionary 
transitions from one species to another to involve running through a series of incrementally 
different transitional forms except for some specific transition e which is taken as a basic 
phenomenon, say, the discrete jump from amphibians to reptiles. S pictures evolutionary 
transitions in general, including e, as evolutionary jumps to be explained in certain ways 
that constitute S. In this case, given the presence of S, it would be hard for advocates of R to 
claim that their treatment of e is adequate against S. Phenomenon e clearly counts in favor 
of S over against R. 
20Oppy, Arguing about Gods, 399.
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However, if “natural” means “regular,” then both types of correlations are 
natural in that they occur regularly, and his analogy goes through. Given 
that in a number of places, Oppy recommends reductive analyses of men-
tal states, the analogy between mental-physical event correlation and heat 
conductivity-micro-vibratory phenomena becomes intelligible: Both are 
correlated because one phenomenon is reducible to the other.
My second reason for thinking that Oppy is using ‘natural’ in the ‘reg-
ular or normal’ sense is based on the following passage:
If it is hard to see how there can be simple, natural connections between 
mental states and brain states, then it is hard to see how there can be a sim-
ple, ‘natural’ way for an orthodoxly conceived monotheistic god to establish 
connections between mental states and brain states. Given the alleged dif-
ficulties that confront the materialist hypothesis that there are simple and 
natural connections between mental states and brain states, surely there 
are equally considerable difficulties that confront the contention that it is 
simple and natural to suppose that there is an orthodoxly conceived mono-
theistic god that brings it about that there are connections between mental 
states and brain states.21
This passage makes perfect sense if “natural” means “regular or nor-
mal.” Moreover, the context of this passage resides in Oppy’s response 
to Swinburne’s challenge “to establish natural, law-like connections be-
tween mental events and brain events,”22 and Swinburne clearly employs 
“natural” here to mean “regular.” Finally, Oppy’s remarks do not make 
sense if “natural” means “not surprising, at home, not odd.” On this read-
ing, given theism, there is nothing unnatural (surprising, not at home, 
odd) about mental states or their natural (regular, usual) correlation with 
brain states, since the states and their correlations bear a relevant similar-
ity to other entities in a theistic ontology and are explanatory within the 
resources of divine omnipotence. In this case, there is no difficulty with 
these being “natural” (not surprising, at home, not odd) given orthodox 
monotheism, contrary to what Oppy claims. Thus, it is more charitable to 
interpret “natural” as “regular or normal.”
Here is my third reason for interpreting “natural” as I do: In rebut-
ting Swinburne’s argument that there are serious difficulties in seeing the 
connection between mental and brain states as a natural one, Oppy says 
this: “Chalmers (1996) provides a nice example of a theory in which there 
are simple, natural connections between phenomenal states and physical 
states, even though there is no, even in-principle, reduction of the one to 
the other.”23 However, Chalmers’s approach is a version of panpsychism, 
and it is “natural” in only two senses: it is not theistic and it establishes 
“regular and normal” connections between the relevant states. But it is 
not natural in the sense that panpsychist mental entities are odd and not 
21Ibid., 400.
22Ibid., 398.
23Ibid., 399.
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at home in a physicalist, naturalist ontology, nor can their existence be ad-
equately explained by the Grand Story with its combinatorial processes, 
a point that Chalmers acknowledges.24 In fact, in what may be the most 
authoritative presentation and defense of panpsychism in recent years, 
David Skirbina frankly notes that “throughout history, panpsychism has, 
at almost every point, served as an antipode” to naturalism precisely be-
cause mental entities are odd and not at home in the naturalist ontological 
depiction of matter as brute, mechanical stuff.25
Oppy’s use of “natural” is dialectically significant. It leads him to under- 
estimate the difficulty that the existence of mental states (or their regular 
correlation with brain states) presents to naturalism as stated in prem-
ise (5), and to overestimate the ease with which naturalism can embrace 
and explain the irreducibly mental. These inaccurate estimates occur in 
two places.
The first resides in Oppy’s defeater of (5) which suggests that a natu-
ralistic evolutionary explanation of mental correlations is available to the 
naturalist.26 Now if Oppy is after regular correlations here, then given the 
existence of mental states and certain assumptions about their causal rela-
tion to brain states on the one hand, and environmental inputs and out-
puts on the other, an evolutionary explanation is, indeed, readily available 
in terms of the reproductive advantage certain correlations confer on the 
organisms that exhibit them. However, if the issue is one of explaining the 
origin of mental states in the first place, given the naturalist ontology and 
the simple rearrangement of parts in the atomic theory of matter and the 
processes of mutation, genetic drift, and so forth, then no such evolution-
ary explanation will be forthcoming. Such an explanation is the wrong 
kind of explanation altogether. It may be apt for explaining the origin of 
certain new relational structures, but it is singularly inadequate to explain 
the origin of sui generis, new, simple emergent properties by way of the 
evolutionary rearrangement of parts bereft even of the potentiality for the 
mental. This second task is more severe, and it is hardly addressed by 
Oppy’s brief appeal to evolutionary explanation.
The second inaccurate estimate resides in Oppy’s failure to assess 
accurately the expectedness of mental entities given naturalism and back-
ground knowledge: P(e/¬h&k) where e = the existence of mental states, 
¬h = naturalism (technically, it is the negation of theism, but we can assume 
that theism and naturalism are the only live options for present purpos-
es), and k = background knowledge. Basically, Oppy rests content to rebut 
Swinburne’s arguments that P(e/¬h&k) is much lower than P(e/h&k) and, 
having done that in his mind, to conclude that there is no reason to see 
the former as lower than the latter. Now, in spite of how things go with 
24David Chalmers, The Conscious Mind (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 106–
108, 115, 121–122, 125, 126–129, 152–153, 170, 293–301, 305.
25David Skirbina, Panpsychism in the West (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 4.
26Oppy, Arguing about Gods, 396.
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Swinburne’s reasons for this conclusion, I have already given a reason, in 
terms of the basic ontology of naturalism and the combinatorial processes 
constitutive of the Grand Story, for thinking that P(e/¬h&k) is low indeed, 
given the proper characterization of “natural.”
Furthermore, recall that in the early days of emergentism in the eigh-
teenth and early nineteenth centuries, emergent properties were charac-
terized epistemically, viz., as those which were unpredictable, even from 
a God’s-eye perspective, from a complete knowledge of the subvenient 
base. That subvenient base provided no explanatory or predictive grounds 
for emergent properties precisely as emergent entities. Now it makes no 
difference for the relevance of this point that today we construe emergent 
properties ontologically and not epistemically. Even on the ontological 
construal, emergent properties are completely sui generis relative to the 
entities and processes at the subvenient base. In this regard, the following 
characterization by Timothy O’Connor may be taken as canonical:
An emergent property of type E will appear only in physical systems 
achieving some specific threshold of organized complexity. From an em-
pirical point of view, this threshold will be arbitrary, one that would not 
be anticipated by a theorist whose understanding of the world was derived 
from theories developed entirely from observations of physical systems 
below the requisite complexity. In optimal circumstances, such a theorist 
would come to recognize the locally determinative interactive dispositions 
of basic physical entities. Hidden from his view, however, would be the 
tendency . . . to generate an emergent state.27
For these reasons, P(e/¬h&k) is so low as to approximate zero. And in 
light of my discussion earlier about how the presence of a rival affects the 
dialectical situation, it is question-begging and ad hoc for Oppy simply 
to label the existence of mental states (or their correlations with physical 
states) as a basic, naturalistic fact in need of no explanation.
At this point, someone may advance the following counterargument: 
There is reason to think that P(e/¬h&k) is not low. Suppose we let e be the 
property of wetness and not-h be the hypothesis of H2O. Then while e is 
totally unexpected, it is also physically necessary and so highly probable. 
The same could be said for mental properties and events.
In response, the first thing to note is Timothy O’Connor’s point that 
emergent properties must be shown to arise by way of causal necessita-
tion from a micro-physical base if we are to “render emergent phenomena 
naturalistically explicable.”28 Among his reasons for this claim is the as-
sertion that if the link between micro-base and emergent properties is a 
contingent one, then the only explanation for the existence and constancy 
of the link is a theistic explanation.29
27Timothy O’Connor and Hong Yu Wong, “The Metaphysics of Emergence,” Nous 39 
(2005), 665–666.
28Timothy O’Connor, Persons and Causes (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 112.
29Ibid., n8, 70–71
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Second, setting aside reductive analyses of secondary qualities (such 
analyses render secondary qualities a bad analogy with mental proper-
ties/events as employed in AC and would be equivalent to denying prem-
ise [1]), since the mechanical philosophy of Galileo, Locke, and others, 
secondary qualities have been ubiquitously construed as contingently 
related to the relevant physical states. This can be seen by the fact that, 
though it has (rightly) fallen on hard times these days, for centuries the 
adjectival sense datum theory of perception was widely adopted in West-
ern thought. On this view, secondary qualities (wetness, being red) could 
be lifted out of the physical object in the mind-independent world with-
out perturbing that object, and placed in the mind as characteristics of 
sensation. This move entails that secondary qualities are not features of 
objects that are necessitated by their micro-bases; thus, even if we leave 
secondary qualities in objects, they are still contingently related to the 
objects’ physical aspects. Moreover, just as we have very strong intuitions 
that zombie, disembodied, and inverted qualia worlds are possible, even 
within the range of worlds physically and relevantly similar to the actual 
world, so we have the same intuitions about secondary qualities (redness 
could have been correlated with a different wavelength, etc.). These intu-
itions are present whether we leave irreducible secondary qualities in the 
external objects themselves or place them in the mind.
Finally, along with mental and normative properties, secondary quali-
ties are paradigm cases of sui generis new kinds of properties not charac-
teristic of the micro-physical world. As such, it was customary in the early 
days of the mechanical philosophy to explain the existence and regular 
correlation of the instantiation of secondary qualities and physical prop-
erties as being the result of “God’s good pleasure.” Thus, the connections 
between secondary qualities and their correlated physical bases are con-
tingent and have, themselves, been used in an argument for God in a way 
analogous to AC.
Space considerations forbid me from doing much here by way of esti-
mating P(e/h&k) except to note one thing: given the proper understanding 
of “natural,” it is clear that finite mental states are ontologically natural 
(they bear a relevant similarity to the core entities in the theistic ontol-
ogy, viz., God’s mental states) and explanatorily natural (their appearance 
is within the powers of Divine omnipotence). Given further reasons for 
why God would bring about finite conscious beings, P(e/h&k) is nowhere 
near as low as P(e/¬h&k) which approaches zero. At least that is what the 
advocate of AC will argue.
Oppy’s misconstrual of “natural,” then, results in a mistaken assess-
ment of P(e/¬h&k), especially in relation to P(e/h&k). But his misconstrual 
also results in Oppy’s identification of the wrong factor as the key one for 
a Bayesian assessment of AC. To see this, recall that:
 P(h/e&k)    =    P(h)    x    P(e/h&k)
P(¬h/e&k)        P(¬h)        P(e/¬h&k)
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Oppy claims that the key probability for AC is the prior probability of 
theism (and, I assume, the ratio of which it is a part). According to Oppy, 
given that this is not high, Swinburne’s inductive arguments for orthodox 
monotheism “are in serious trouble.”30 Oppy reaches this conclusion be-
fore he begins to consider the expectedness of mental states on naturalism 
and theism, though I am certain that he takes comfort in this conclusion 
based on his later claim about the parity of the estimates regarding ex-
pectedness. Now, clearly, a low prior probability of theism does not by 
itself undercut AC. Even if that probability is low, it could be offset by 
an extremely low P(e/¬h&k) which would, in turn, make the key ratio be 
P(e/h&k) over P(e/¬h&k). And that is what an advocate of AC should ar-
gue, for even if P(h) and P(e/h&k) are somewhat low, the really low factor 
is P(e/¬h&k) which, as I said above, approximates zero.
My purpose has not been to argue for AC, but to respond to Oppy’s 
main criticisms of it. And while I cannot argue the point here, it seems 
that the best move for Oppy to make is to reject (1) in favor of some version 
of strict physicalism, an option he regularly considers throughout his es-
say. For some, this move will be obvious and it is a small price to pay. For 
others, it is fodder for a reductio against naturalism.31
Talbot School of Theology, Biola University
30Oppy, Arguing about Gods, 395.
31I wish to thank William Lane Craig, Thomas Flint and an anonymous referee for help-
ful comments on an earlier draft of this article.
